

European Security Identities

Contested Understandings of EU and NATO

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Chapter 7

NATO AND THE EU:

THE QUESTION OF DELINEATION IN THE BALTIC AREA

MARIANNE TAKLE

Introduction

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union (Russia) from Eastern and Central Europe, NATO and the EU have expanded their institutional arrangements in this area. These institutional arrangements comprise every shade from fully integrated membership to essentially loose cooperation, and the cooperation in different areas has different levels of contact. The new institutional borders differ from the traditional nation-state border or the total character of the Iron Curtain, where the military, economical, political and cultural borders were in the same place. NATO and the EU do not want to define too precisely the borderline between membership and non-membership, and the borders are often described as temporary because the enlargement is an ongoing process. The institutions seem inclined to wish to establish an unclear border in the east.

The establishment of unclear and temporary institutional borders is characteristic for the Baltic area, as this area seems to have a double belonging. Since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent states in 1991, they have worked to introduce liberal democracies and market economies with the aim of being included in the Euro-Atlantic community. But the more the Baltic states search for security in the West at the expense of Russia, the more Russia feels threatened. This in turn will intensify Russian priorities in the area, where Russia still has special interests. NATO and the EU are attempting to define the Baltic states as a part and parcel of their economic, political and cultural community. Through this integration an attempt is made to raise the threshold for possible Russian ambitions in the area, without the provision of military guaranties to the Baltic states.

This study will treat NATO and the EU as a political institutionalization of a common Western identity; this is both conceptual and organizational, as the institutions both support a set of ideas and administer concrete practical solutions. The study takes

The analysis will explore the enlargement processes of these institutions along two axes: (a) Along a time axis. Here, the relationship between the two phases is crucial. If the second phase does not confirm what has been said in the first phase, then it will undermine the preceding process of legitimization. (b) Along a behavioural axis. Differences in the behaviour of NATO and the EU in the two phases can reveal important differences between the institutions.

The differences between the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU can be explained by the fact that the two institutions have different purposes and member-states. While NATO is mainly concerned about defence and security questions and is based on the USA's military capacity, the EU is focused on economic cooperation that is gradually extending into new areas.

In this case-study the differences are mainly explained by the different groups of actors NATO and the EU must take into consideration when they assess an enlargement with respect to the Baltic states. This issue is closely linked to the constitution of an European identity and the restructuring of the European state system in the 1990s. One can think of three kinds or groups of actors that have to perceive the enlargement process as legitimate, or at least accept the situation. One group of actors are the institutions themselves, with their demands for remaining intact in the process of enlargement. Another group of actors to be taken into consideration is that of the applicant countries. Their wish for membership has placed a pressure on NATO and the EU. The third actor is Russia.

The investigation comprises three parts. The first contains a general discussion about two perspectives with two different security logics applied to NATO and the EU's relations to Russia and the position of the Baltic states in this connection. The second part is founded upon a systematic run-through of the first phase of the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU and the manner in which these processes scrutinize the Baltic states. The third part looks at the second phase of the enlargement processes and examines the kinds of solutions found for the Baltic states. In both phases, a comparison is made between the institutions in relation to the two models, and this is explained in terms of the actors they must take into consideration.

The Eastern Enlargement: Two Perspectives

In a cosmos-chaos perspective, the enlargement of NATO and the EU is explained as an expansion of an order against a periphery based on chaos, a non-order. Brussels is perceived as a Western centre surrounded by concentric circles that spread out from a Western cosmos towards a continuously increasing degree of chaos in the peripheral East. While cooperation in the centre is intense, the association with the centre becomes gradually looser as one moves eastwards (Tunander, 1997). The alternative to a cosmos, in this case, is a negation, a non-order, and the course between cosmos and chaos can be understood as a scale of values. In this perspective the Baltic states will be seen as a Western periphery, and the question will be to what extent they can move closer to the Western centre.

In a multi-polar perspective, one to a larger degree acknowledges that there is another pole which is a centre in its own right, and not only a periphery of chaos. In this perspective, the expanded cooperation eastward is not only a question of expanding an order of stability as in the cosmos-chaos perspective, but also a question of how one centre acts in relation to another. Wæver (1997) adopts a multi-polar perspective when he uses the idea of an empire as a metaphor to describe the centre-periphery tendency in the EU. Wæver imagines three empires, each with their own centre of gravitation and with self-imaging as a centre: one with its core in Brussels, one with its core in Moscow and one with its core in Ankara. He does not draw up an image of the EU as a centrally ruled empire, but as a looser institutional structure with diffuse patterns of control.

Wæver's empire metaphor neither claims that the three empires are organized in a similar way, nor that they are equally powerful. The key is: 'whether they each succeed in forming a centre of gravity, a self-conception as a centre, which pulls other states into their orbit and, not least, whether they begin to behave differently from what would be the case if they were just peripheral to the one "European" society'" (1997: 77). He also describes the frontiers as gradually receding and as diffuse in the overlaps between the empires. Diffuse power relations and dual interests influence the grey zone between two empires. The Baltic states are situated in exactly such an area where two imperial zones cross each other.

In the multi-polar perspective, the Baltic states are situated between two centres, as both the West and Russia regard the Baltic states as a part of their spheres. This double interest in the Baltic area leads many to see the Baltic states' membership in NATO and the EU as a litmus test for the future relationship between the Western community and Russia (Jopp & Arnswald, 1998). The Baltic states themselves are Western in orientation and want to fit in with Western premises.

If the Baltic area is seen as a grey zone between the Western community and Russia, the question of adherence to the West for the Baltic states will not simply be a question of distance from Brussels but also a question of how the centre in the West will treat the Baltic countries in its own balance with Russia (Asmus & Nurick, 1996). This balance is dependent to a lesser degree on what happens in the Baltic Sea region than in other areas with greater conflict potential, such as Kosovo. Owing to the Baltic states' geopolitical position, Russia's importance in relation to these states is much greater than what would generally be suggested by Russia's weakened international position.

The central question, using the two different perspectives, is to what extent Russia is acknowledged by the Western community as another centre. In a cosmos-chaos perspective, Russia is seen as chaos, a periphery to the Western cosmos. Russia has to adapt to Western conditions. In the eyes of the West, Russia has a long history of learning from the West (Neumann, 1997). In a multi-polar perspective, Russia is recognized as being another centre that the Western community has to act in relation to. Russia, of course, does not see itself as a periphery in Western structures.

A cosmos-chaos perspective, enlargement is about Kosovo, the Balkans. As Tunander, two contradictory use both of the enlargement process.

The First Phase

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The reasoning of a cosmos-chaos expansion way to undermine is obvious: are present in line with Russian perspective.

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¹ The study was published on 9 July 1997.

² The North Atlantic Treaty

³ See NATO (1997)

A cosmos–chaos perspective demands an obscure demarcation. In a multi-polar perspective, enlargement means that a new border is drawn against another sphere where the enlargement ends. NATO and the EU's official descriptions of what the enlargement is about is often based on a cosmos–chaos perspective. But, as demonstrated in Kosovo, the Western community is also forced to recognize Russia as another centre. As Tunander (1997) emphasizes, these different ways of thinking seem to represent two contradictory tendencies in post–Cold War Europe. And it looks as if one must use both of them at the same time to understand the actors operative in the enlargement process.

The First Phase and Assessments of the Baltic States

NATO's Reasons and Criteria in the Assessment of the Baltic States

NATO's Study on Enlargement, published in September 1995, has been the central foundational document in NATO's first round of enlargement, and is still NATO's benchmark document for future applicant countries.¹ In a premeditated move, NATO has not presented any strict criteria for countries that are to be admitted as new members. The NATO study explains that decisions on enlargement are scrutinized with a view to whether they 'will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic Area at the time such a decision is to be made' (NATO, 1995). NATO's demands are general. The message passed is value-based. All future members must agree with NATO's values. Especially referred to are the value criteria set down in the 1949 Washington Treaty: the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.²

The reasoning for the enlargement used in the official documents follows the logic of a cosmos–chaos perspective. The enlargement is described in several documents as an expansion of an area with stability and order against a disorder.³ This might be a way to undermine the importance of a new border, but at the same time as the reasoning is obviously based on the expansion of liberal values, a series of strategic priorities are present in the argumentation. Here the central underlying theme is the demarcation line with Russia. In this respect the argumentation follows the logic of a multi-poled perspective.

This combination of arguments, which at the same time follows two different logics of security, can lead to the conclusion that Russia is recognized as an alternative centre in some aspects and seen as a periphery in other. Particularly in the Baltic area, it does look as though Russian military interests are acknowledged (Jopp & Arnsward, 1998), and in this respect Russia is seen as an alternative centre.

¹ The study was also referred to as NATO's benchmark document in the declaration from Madrid, 9 July 1997.

² The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949.

³ See NATO (1995) and NATO's declaration from Madrid, 9 July 1997.

In several places in chapters one and two of NATO's study one can find arguments of what an enlargement must not lead to:

- a) The enlargement shall not lead to a new dividing of the continent.
- b) The enlargement shall be a part of a process that does not threaten anyone.
- c) No outside country has right of veto concerning the enlargement process.
- d) NATO does not accept any spheres of influence in present day Europe.⁴

These arguments outline very clearly the problems raised by the enlargement, and the idea that they will become reality is rejected. Each point pertains to the drawing up of a border towards an undefined third party. The arguments show that the boundary question is the expansion's underlying sore point, though one which NATO denies exists. In the following I will discuss the denials point by point. The question is to examine whether an enlargement of NATO is possible without developments taking the direction that NATO denies that they will.

- a) NATO's establishing of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) – later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) – and Partnership for Peace (PFP) are attempts to prevent NATO's borders from becoming definite and the continent from being divided anew. The problem lies in that the offer to non-members is not based on mutuality. The area where this unbalance is most pronounced and where the question of a new division of the continent is at the forefront is in relation to Russia. NATO has not managed to build a cooperation with Russia that is based on the same rights and duties (S+F, 1999). Both the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in Paris in 1997 and Russian membership in the G-8 can be viewed as concessions NATO has afforded Russia for the enlargement, not as attempts to pull the Russians into the Western institutional cooperation.
- b) The denial that NATO's enlargement threatens anyone is simultaneously a rejection of the Russian appreciation of the situation. Here NATO's perception of the situation is in opposition to the Russian perception of the same process. What NATO describes as a process leading to increased security and stability for the entire continent is seen by the Russians as a military bloc expanding its territory.
- c) Emphasizing that no country outside NATO shall be accorded the right of veto in the question of expansion is NATO's way of replying to Russian protests against enlargement. In this lies an implicit declaration that NATO is not willing to take into account Russian interests in Eastern and Central Europe. However, in the discussion about Baltic membership it looks as if the arguments are reversed. An argument often used is that one cannot expand to the Baltic states on account of Russia (Bertram, 1997; Jopp & Arnsward, 1998).

⁴ See chapters one and two in NATO (1995)

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- d) NATO does not accept the existence of spheres of interest in modern-day Europe. But in fact this is the principal question in relation to the Baltic states. According to NATO's description of the situation, the Baltic states are in the process of fulfilling NATO's criteria for membership: they are three small, peaceful states which profess NATO's values and are in the process of introducing democratic judicial systems and market economies following a Western pattern. If they are not brought into the NATO fold, does this then mean that NATO accepts that they are part of a Russian sphere of influence?

At the meeting in Madrid in July 1997 the Baltic countries were addressed as aspiring members, and NATO recognized the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region. In the Madrid declaration it is stressed that all future aspiring members are evaluated independently of their geographical position, and that no European state that fulfils the membership criteria will be excluded from this assessment.⁵ Such an explicit declaration ought to broker for the Baltic countries being on an equal footing with other aspiring countries; this should entail that the Baltic states can look forward to a bright future inside NATO.

Yet at the same time as the Baltic states still are considered as potential member countries, the declaration is attempting to reduce the importance of NATO membership. The enlargement of NATO is being described as merely a step in a larger process on the road to establishing a greater European security architecture, which also comprises the roles of the EU (WEU) and OSCE within the same process.⁶

The EU's Reasons And Criteria In The Assessment Of The Baltic States

The directive document for the EU's expansion, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union* (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997), was presented on 16 July 1997 by former president of the European Commission Jacques Santer. This was a 1300-page document in which the commission not only set out general premises for membership – like NATO's study – but also provided an evaluation of the ten applicant countries in relation to how well prepared they are for becoming EU members.

The EU, like NATO, uses a values-based reasoning for expanding. The EU's official rhetoric, like NATO's, is based on the idea that it is the area of order that is expanding to the eastern periphery. In this perspective Russia is not acknowledged as an alternative centre but seen as chaos. Although the EU enlargement in all probability will not include Russia, the demarcation line towards Russia is not the central theme in the enlargement process. Strategic priorities are not conspicuous in the EU enlargement discussion, in contrast with the NATO discussion.

⁵ Declaration from Madrid, 9 July 1997.

⁶ The Baltic states signed a Baltic Charter of Partnership with the USA in Washington in January 1997. This can be seen as compensation for membership in NATO. However the USA did not provide any military guarantees to the Baltic states.

The evaluation in *Agenda 2000* was based on the criteria for membership that were drawn up by the European Council at the June 1993 meeting in Copenhagen. The first clause is political, the second is economic and the third clause deals with the countries' general ability to undertake the commitments membership places upon them (*aquis communitaris*).

The evaluation of Lithuania was overall more favourable where political criteria were taken into account.⁷ On the part of Estonia and Latvia, facilitating better integration of Russian-speaking minorities into society was seen as necessary.⁸ The commission's evaluation of the economies of Latvia and Lithuania was far poorer than that for Estonia. With respect to the third criterion, the conclusion was that all three countries were considered to need considerable and sustained increase in their efforts.

The EU Commission's right to make proposals, the precise criteria and the openness around the evaluation of each applicant state has made the enlargement look like a process based on objective criteria. This stands in contrast to NATO's much more closed affair. But the EU does not say anything about the internal ranking of the criteria. If the political criteria are more important than the economic, Lithuania should have been brought into membership negotiations in the first round. On the other hand, if economic criteria are the most important, Estonia is the most qualified of the three Baltic states.

The EU's former president Jacques Santer expressed the view in *Agenda 2000* that the EU's expansion process is not a process of exclusion. 'On the contrary,' he said, 'it is a process of inclusion that will be pursued permanently.' This can be understood as a way of making diffuse the EU's borders in the east, because the borders drawn today are described as impermanent. The process is an ongoing process, but where will it stop? In *Agenda 2000* it is stated that the Union's borders would be extended through enlargement as far eastwards as the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

In a Baltic context, the most interesting aspect is that new borders can be established between the Baltic states on one hand and the Baltic states and Russia (Kaliningrad) and Belarus on the other. In the Baltic states' process of accommodation towards becoming a part of the EU, their economic orientation has gradually faced Westwards since independence in 1991, while their attachment to Russia has become considerably weakened.⁹ In this manner, the Baltic states are attempting to cut off Russian structures that interfere in their area. This is the opposite of the Russian policy in the Baltic

⁷ Minorities represent nearly 20% of the population of Lithuania. The 1991 law on nationality has made a major contribution by granting citizenship to some 90% of persons belonging to minorities. All now have Lithuanian nationality; see 'Commission Opinion on Lithuania's Application for Membership of the European Union', in Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1997).

⁸ According to *Agenda 2000*, minorities represent nearly 35% of the population in Estonia, and some 23% of the population do not have citizenship. In Latvia the corresponding figures are 44% and 28%; see 'Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union' and 'Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the European Union', in Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1997).

⁹ See Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997.

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area in the period from 1945 to 1990 (Blakkisrud, 1995). It is also the reverse of the process the Western institutions have set in motion concerning their eastward enlargement. The institutions try to make the borderline more diffuse, but the EU's official documents cannot get away from the fact that an expansion encompassing the Baltic states will lead to the EU's incorporating several hundred thousand ethnic Russians.¹⁰

The Second Phase: Eastern Enlargement and the Boundaries in the Baltic Area

NATO's Enlargement and Boundaries in the Baltic Area

The formal decision about which countries should be a part of NATO's first enlargement was made at NATO's July 1997 meeting in Madrid. After the formal decision was made, the road to membership for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary was short. In March 1999 they were full members of NATO. Compared with the EU enlargement, the implementation of the NATO enlargement has been a quick process. The actual membership candidates did not go through extensive transformation processes and long-lasting negotiations with NATO before they became members. Other candidates were discussed at the Madrid meeting, but the selection of the three candidates and the quick enlargement process can be explained by the USA's central role in NATO (Smith, 1999).

The connection between NATO's criteria, each state's qualifications and those states that already have become members is unclear.¹¹ The choice of the three new member-states suggests that NATO's enlargement follows the security logic of a multi-polar perspective. As we have already seen, the official reasoning for the enlargement followed the logic of a cosmos-chaos perspective, but at the same time the strategic assessments are striking. There is much evidence that an important aspect of the enlargement is the drawing of a borderline against Russia.

NATO's reservations concerning bringing the Baltic states into the fold can in all probability be explained in view of the Russian interests in the region (Asmus & Nurick, 1996). Nevertheless, the Baltic states are regarded as part of a Western economic and cultural sphere. There is an attempt to define the Baltic states as a part and parcel

¹⁰ See Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1997), where it is also pointed out that within the historically short period from 1934 to 1979, census counts show that the Russian segment of the Estonian population increased from 8.3% to 27.9%. The comparable figures for Latvia in the period 1935-79 were from 12% to 32.8%. *Agenda 2000* does not contain any comparable figures for Lithuania.

¹¹ In preparation for the decision made at the Madrid summit of 1997, a report was compiled. This was an analysis of military and other relevant factors associated with the admission of new members. But it cannot be compared with the comprehensive report made by the EU Commission.

of the Western economic and cultural community, but on the other hand ultimately concessions must be made to military strategic evaluations. Taking into account Russia's military interests in the region, the Baltic states are widely considered as 'undefensible' (van Ham, 1998).

In addition, some indicators on the Russian side shows that the Baltic states receive two different treatments in Russian foreign policy. The Baltic states are no longer defined as 'near abroad' within the Russian Foreign Service. They are actually filed along with the other Nordic countries (Tunander, 1997). But there are still indicators that confirm that not only the Commonwealth of Independent States but also the Baltic states are perceived as within Russia's sphere of influence (Carrafiello & Vertongen, 1997). The objective from the Russian side might be to retain the Baltic states within Russia's sphere of economic and political influence and restrain Western military presence within the region (Herd, 1999a).

NATO's diffuse criteria in the enlargement process make it difficult for the Baltic states to work systematically towards membership in NATO. Lithuania's Secretary of State interpreted the facts to mean that NATO, through its reasoning for expansion, has given itself a moral commitment to enlarge with countries that fulfil the criteria in the same way as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary do.¹² This is an attempt to harness NATO with a commitment towards the Baltic states. From Lithuania's point of view, all they lack is a buildup of their defence capabilities in order to fulfil NATO's criteria.

The moral arguments used by Lithuania give an example of the problems that increased weight on values can lead to in post-Cold War Europe. The relationship between the arguments based on values and the strategic aims is complex. For NATO, the moral commitments can lead to legitimacy problems.

The Baltic states have been part of NATO's attempts to establish all-European stability-promoting measures right from the start. They participated in the foundation of the NACC in 1991, of which the EAPC became an extension. The Baltic states' framework document for PFP was signed in 1995. Through their PFP forces the Baltic states can participate in joint operations with other NATO countries and other applicant nations, as witnessed in Bosnia.¹³ The formation of a Baltic battalion (BALBAT) and a number of training programs for armed forces personnel from various Western NATO countries have been part of preparations for membership.

Through the various cooperation programs, the Baltic states are afforded a possibility of participating in that part of NATO that is geared towards flexible action, on which NATO places more emphasis in its new strategy (NATO, 1999¹⁴; Yost, 1998). Yet the Baltic states' contributions to NATO's peacekeeping operations will not in

¹² This argument was also used by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Sudargas at a seminar, arranged by The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, in Oslo, 20 April 1999.

¹³ The Baltic forces in IFOR, later SFOR, in Bosnia were a part of a larger Nordic brigade, together with contingents from Sweden, Finland and Poland.

¹⁴ This was approved with the participation of heads of state and government in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, 23-24 April 1999.

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themselves be sufficient to grant membership. The three countries lack the financial resources necessary to make each individual country's defence capabilities compatible with those of the NATO countries. It is nevertheless this mutual defence obligation that the three Baltic countries in principle wish to join (Lejins & Ozolina, 1997).

For their part, the Baltic states use NATO and the EU in their national liberation projects aimed against Russian domination. Russia is not only seen as chaos but as a centre. In relation to the Baltic states, Russia behaves with a self-conception as a centre and tries to keep the previous Russian domination in the area.

The Baltic region has for the most part been subject to Russian hegemony for almost 300 years, since the Great Nordic War (1700–21).¹⁵ There have been two periods of exception from Russian rule; on both occasions, Russia has been severely weakened. One of these periods was from around 1918 to 1940. During that period the Baltic states functioned as independent states. The other exceptional period lasted from 1941 to 1944 when Soviet troops were pushed back by German forces. A third period is that of today, and it started with the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1990–91.

The time spent under the Soviet Union has left traces from which the Baltic states cannot easily free themselves (Herd, 1999b). To a large degree, the fact that the Soviet Union carried on the former power structure by establishing a Russian political and administrative elite is the cause of this. One consequence of this was that the borders between the Baltic states and Russia had less relevance during the Soviet era – militarily, economically and demographically. Today the Baltic states want to build strong control along the common borders with Russia by establishing boundary posts, customs and visas (Baev, 1995). The most important material and symbolic action since the Baltic states became independent was the removal of Russian military forces from Baltic soil; by August 1994 the Russian military withdrawal had been completed. Another important gesture was the formal agreement on new frontiers towards Russia. The hottest point of contention – especially in the relationship of Estonia and Latvia with Russia – is the position of the Russian-speaking minorities within the region. The fact that this issue is used by Russia to underline Russian interests in the region is strongly criticized by the Baltic states (Lejins & Ozolina, 1997).

After completing an enlargement with three states, NATO emphasized in the official declaration that the possibility for a further enlargement is still open. NATO is in many ways back in the first phase of the enlargement process. The question is whether this will be a permanent solution or only a temporary one while the membership candidates are preparing for becoming members. But in NATO's opening for a new enlargement process lies a disciplinary effect on the applicant countries.

¹⁵ The Baltic region has been under Danish, German and Swedish rule at different times. From a nation-state perspective, the history of the Baltic states history is one of changing foreign rule.

The EU's Negotiations and Boundaries in the Baltic Area

The suggestions of the Commission in *Agenda 2000* that the enlargement should start with Poland, the Czech republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Estonia were passed by the European Council in December 1997, and negotiations for expanding with the first of these countries started in March 1999. The six first membership candidates were offered negotiations and gradual adjustments to the EU's conditions. The other candidates were included in the negotiations after the decision made at EU ministerial meeting in Helsinki in December 1999.¹⁶

In contrast with NATO, the candidates have to go through a much longer transformation process to become members of the EU. The differences between the two enlargement processes can be explained by the fact that a precondition for enlargement to take place is an agreement inside the institutions. According to Wæver's (1997) empire metaphor the primary function of the EU is to keep the core intact. It is to ensure that there is a centre, rather than several Western European states with different interests. This is easier in NATO than in the EU because of the USA's relative strength inside NATO. While the agreement about the enlargement of NATO seems to be based on the US leadership, there is not *one* leading state inside the EU (Smith, 1999).

At the meeting in Copenhagen in 1993, when the criteria that the candidates had to fulfil were established, the EU also set up a goal for the EU's own preparations to open for new members.¹⁷ This goal reveals that one of the most significant problems in the EU enlargement process lies not in the applicant countries but inside the EU itself. The need for internal economic and institutional adjustments before an enlargement can take place is precarious.

A study independent of the EU Commission shows a clear connection between the countries that fulfil the EU's criteria and the countries that have been drawn into the first round of membership negotiations in the EU (Schimmelfenning, 1999). This indicates that, in contrast with NATO, there is a clear connection between the EU's criteria, each state's qualifications and its inclusion in the EU negotiations.

The EU's considerations taken in relation to Russia are dependent on the Russian reaction to the enlargement processes. While Russia has countered the NATO expansion by protecting herself, the expansion of the EU has to a greater degree been seen as a means to achieve increased economic integration in the West (Baev, 1998). This is due to the fact that the EU was regarded as an economic cooperation structure from which Russia could reap advantages through participation, while NATO is regarded as a military alliance that includes the US military capacity. In the economic sphere, Rus-

¹⁶ This is a suggestion made by the commission on 13 October 1999, with the aim of increasing the speed in the enlargement process. The decision was made at the EU ministerial meeting in Helsinki, 10–12 December 1999.

¹⁷ The declaration says: 'The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and ten candidate countries' (Declaration from the European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993).

sia does not play a role in the military sphere.

Russia as a chaotic

The EU's plans to make the EU a membership for the West. And it is about the Baltic states and is therefore a precondition for membership for states are members. Russia will to a large extent determine Russia's position.

The EU's clear adjustments need the legal processes of a new language law, which had to be

There have been changes since 1991. For the first time by the more concentrated into force between the Union framework to support the Union. All three EU through the and they participated in the EU is and operational across the border.

These varied forms of cooperation. The Warsaw Pact could place them in a

The attractive of the Baltic states' and domestic development form of EU fore

¹⁸ *Der Spiegel*, 1999.

¹⁹ See the opinion of the European Commission on Latvia for membership of the European Commun

sia does not place herself as a centre with its own rights in the same way as in the military sphere. The Russian orientation towards the EU makes it possible to perceive Russia as a chaotic periphery to the Western centre in the EU.

The EU's plans to develop stronger cooperation in the defence and security area can make the EU a more important actor in European security in the future. But EU membership for the Baltic states can be an economic door-opener for Russia toward the West. And it is an advantage for Russia that the EU can have a disciplinary effect on the Baltic states in relation to the Russian minority in the area. There is also discussion about the possibility that EU membership can make NATO membership less important and is therefore positively perceived in Russia (Smith, 1999). But all the same EU membership for the Baltic states can create some problems for Russia. If the Baltic states are members of the EU, communication between each of the Baltic states and Russia will to a larger extent go through the EU and not be bilateral. That will weaken Russia's position.

The EU's clear criteria for membership give applicant countries guidance for the adjustments needed for membership. This is of great importance for the internal political processes of the applicant countries. One example is the discussion in Latvia about a new language law. When the president in July 1999 used her right to veto the new law, which had been accepted by the parliament, she referred to the norms in the EU.¹⁸

There have been diplomatic relations between the EU and the Baltic states since 1991. For the first years, these consisted of trade deals, which were then superseded by the more comprehensive Europe Agreements, which were signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1998. The Europe Agreements establish the legal basis for relations between the Union and each of the Baltic states. Their aim is to provide an appropriate framework to support the gradual integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Union. All three states are also receiving technical and financial assistance from the EU through the PHARE programme. They are taking part in EU-structured dialogue and they participate in some of EU's community programmes.¹⁹ The Nordic dimension in the EU is also important for the Baltic states. It is meant to be a policy-oriented and operational statement. In this relation the EU's aim is to promote cooperation across the borders in the Baltic Sea (Jopp & Warjovaara, 1998).

These varied forms of ties with the EU pull the Baltic countries closer to Western cooperation. The Baltic states participate fully in this process on a par with former Warsaw Pact countries, and their past as part of the Soviet Union does not seem to place them in a special category.

The attractiveness of the EU ties the applicant states to the Western structures. The Baltic states' adaptation to Western premises has had an impact on foreign as well as domestic developments. As Sjurson (1999) emphasizes, the enlargement is in itself a form of EU foreign policy. It puts the EU in a position to shape large parts of applicant

¹⁸ *Der Spiegel*, 1999 (30): 147.

¹⁹ See the opinions of the European Commission on the applications of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia for membership in the European Union, in Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1997).

states' domestic and foreign policy. This system demands a lot of the EU because the disciplinary effect can only function if the perspective of eventual membership is kept realistic (Wæver, 1997). If the EU enlargement process becomes a long-lasting process and the EU does not follow what has been promised in the first phase, the process over time can lead to a loss of legitimacy, and the EU will lose its disciplinary effect.

Conclusion

The argument of NATO and the EU in favour of enlargement is that it is an expansion of the area for stability and security in Europe. Both organizations are extremely cautious when it comes to describing the new boundaries. Neither wishes to enhance their strategic priorities or to create new borders against others. Both institutions argue that it is an area for liberal values that is expanding and use a cosmos-chaos perspective in their official rhetoric.

The institutions' double relation to Russia makes this argumentation problematic. It is not possible to establish an area for stability and security in Europe without including Russia in the same area. But Russia cannot be given full membership in NATO or the EU because the institutions would then be overloaded. The establishing of many different and temporary institutional borders is an answer to this dilemma. This would include Russia and the candidate countries in Western institutional structures without giving Russia full membership. The approaches of NATO and the EU have both a strategic element of polarity and an including element. One problem is that the elements of polarity can increase the tension between the Western institutions and Russia.

The Western institutions' emphasis on liberal values can lead to conflicts because it excludes those who are not able to, or willing to, adapt to such values. The drawing of borders cannot only be explained by Western strategic evaluations, but also by the fact that Russia does not share the liberal values which provide the basis for the identity of the Western institutions.

In the first phase of the enlargement process, both NATO and the EU used official argumentation based on a cosmos-chaos perspective. But deeper study of NATO's denials in the official documents confirms that Russia is perceived as the Other in Western security policies. In this respect NATO also argues in a way that corresponds to a multi-polar perspective, though this is denied. This double argumentation, based on an open cosmos-chaos perspective and an underlying multi-polar perspective, is even clearer in the second phase of the NATO enlargement. The strategic evaluations are not accentuated in NATO's official reasoning, but the decisions about who, when and how to enlarge were more openly strategic in this phase. In contrast with NATO, the enlargement of the EU seems to a larger extent to be understood only in terms of a cosmos-chaos perspective. In both phases of the EU enlargement, Russia is perceived much less as a counterpart.

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By explaining these differences between the two perspectives used by NATO and the EU in the two phases of the enlargement processes with the three groups of actors the institutions must take into consideration, we have found the relationship to Russia to be a decisive factor. In the military-strategic field, NATO has an underlying multipolar perspective, where Russia is acknowledged as another centre. This leads to a double treatment of the Baltic states from NATO's side, which can lead to problems of legitimacy. The Baltic states do to a large extent fulfil the liberal values which NATO emphasizes in official rhetoric, but they are not given full membership because of NATO's strategic considerations.

While Russia is protesting against the enlargement of NATO, Russian perception of the enlargement of the EU is more positive. In Russia there has been expressed a wish to be part of the EU enlargement process, and through this Russia defined itself as a periphery to the centre in the EU. The Russian reaction to EU enlargement can be explained by two facts: (1) the centre in the EU is not as strong as the centre around the USA inside NATO; and (2) Russia marks her own position in the military and political area, but not in the economic area.

The discrepancy between the two phases in the EU enlargement is not to be found in the relation to Russia but in fact that the membership promised to the applicant countries in the first phase only led to a long-lasting negotiation process. One important obstacle for the implementation of the enlargement lies in how prepared the EU itself is for enlargement. The EU must keep the prospect of keeping the core intact, and deepen the integration for the enlargement to be perceived as legitimate inside the EU. But the disciplinary effect that the EU has on the applicant countries can only function as long as the perspective of eventual membership is kept realistic (Wæver, 1995).

Although there are not established formal linkages between the two processes, this does not mean that each has been completely unaffected by the other (Smith, 1999). For the Baltic states it seems more realistic to become a member of the EU than of NATO. In this connection the relation to Russia is also decisive. Membership in the EU might be an alternative to NATO membership. It is also easier to prepare for membership in the EU. While the EU operates with an open decision process – in which the criteria are minutely highlighted and the evaluations of each separate country's possibilities are discussed from area to area – NATO's process is a more closed affair. NATO's criteria are vague and one criterion refers to a general holistic evaluation of the security situation in the given area. But when it comes to the accession to institutions the picture changes. While NATO's decision to enlarge with three countries is quickly followed by implementation, the EU enlargement is a long-lasting process.

Although the liberal values are important for drawing of new borders, the political weight of the institutions' common values can be questioned in the Baltic area. The official reasoning of both NATO and the EU for enlargement is solely based on the idea of inclusion into a community of common values. The institutions define themselves as communities of common values, but this do not always secure an implementation of those values. The Baltic states are stuck in a dilemma between politics

based on values and strategic interests. To the same extent as there is a split between Russia and the Western institutions, the Baltic dilemma is an example of a European dilemma.

Chapter 8

A TIDAL EU

G. PINAR TANK

Introduction

In describing Russia in 1968 of a 'tidal Wall in 1989 and to be included in the about a shift in the '1 security organization defining the Europe where the boundaries countries 'belong' in

Much is made of the Europe. In the post-cooperating with each others profess to work who is to be included in their defence region,² indicate the case of Turkey, which list despite its lastin wards Europe, its id

However, Norman modern idea evolving of 'Christendom' in gling against the d Christianity has co scribing Europe, T. common culture' at

¹ Parker (1968), quo

² Although the regio and Cyprus have b in the area.